

The centrality of the voice of the person

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Mental Capacity Act 2005 (1)

- Key concepts:
 - Statutory principles
 - Mental capacity: a functional test, with a ‘causative nexus’ required between disturbance or impairment in the functioning of the mind of brain and the inability to make the decision
 - Best interests: a statutory test based on ‘checklist’
- Guided informality: “Section 5 of the 2005 Act gives a *general authority*, to act in relation to the care or treatment of P, to those caring for him *who reasonably believe both that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter and that it will be in P’s best interests for the act to be done*. This will usually suffice, unless the decision is so serious that the court itself has said it must be taken to court.”

Re MN [2017] UKSC 22, per Baroness Hale

Mental Capacity Act 2005(2)

- Lasting Powers of Attorney (H&W and P&A)
- Advance Decisions to Refuse Treatment
- Oversight by Court of Protection, specialist superior court of record
- Margins of the MCA are contested:
 - Common law tests for eg testamentary capacity
 - The scope of the inherent jurisdiction

English lessons and dilemmas: focusing on the other side of incapacity

- Clearing the groundwork – the meaning of ‘best interests’: “The purpose of the best interests test is to **consider matters from the patient’s point of view**” *Aintree v James* [2014] 1 AC 591
- Not a ‘what P would have done test,’ but if it is clear what P would have done will carry (at a minimum) very great weight absent compelling reasons to contrary, especially in medical context:
 - *Briggs v Briggs* [2016] EWCOP 53
 - Contrast *Wye Valley NHS Trust v B* [2015] EWCOP 60 and *East Lancashire NHS Trust v PW* [2019] EWCOP 10

Standing in the shoes of P – the implications

- The line between clinical appropriateness and best interests / will and preferences-based decision-making: *University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust v HB* [2018] EWCOP 39: “it is plain that administering CPR in the event of a further collapse and giving her, albeit a very, very small chance of life, is what she would wish”
- The consistently idiosyncratic (*Wye Valley*) and the pre- and post-incapacity (*Briggs*)
- Where wishes and feelings are not reliably identifiable: *Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v RY & Anor* [2017] EWCOP 2
- Circumstances under which wishes expressed: *ADS v DSM* [2017] EWCOP 8
- The potential for the clash between past and present wishes: “*When past and present wishes collide: the theory, the practice and the future*” Eld. L.J. 2016, 7(2) 132-140

The wider context

- It's not just about the ADMCA
- By analogy: best interests decision-making under the MCA is a choice between available options: *N v ACCG* [2017] UKSC 22
- What is an available option will often be function of decision-making by statutory bodies applying other statutes
- Or family members making their own decisions

One point to watch – AHDs and the change of mind

- MCA 2005 – ADRT not valid if the donor “has done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance decision remaining his fixed decision”
- You’ve not got this loophole: s.85(3) “whilst he or she had capacity to do so, has done anything else...”
- Will you need a flexible interpretation of capacity to avoid the Margo dilemma?

Want to read more?

<http://www.39essex.com/resources-and-training/mental-capacity-law/>

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